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ORIGINALISM’S BITE 
William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs† 
S ORIGINALISM TOOTHLESS? Richard Posner seems to think so. Repeated 
theorizing by “intelligent originalists,” one of us happily included, has 
rendered the theory “incoherent” and capable of supporting almost any 
result.1 Apparently we’ve “come close to conceding” that “originalism 
is nonsense.”2 In this Posner echoes other critics who say that our versions of 
originalism “don’t matter,”3 are “no different than the form embraced by 
living constitutionalists (and liberals),”4 are “trivial,”5 and don’t “tell[] us 
something important about what the Constitution is [or] how to interpret 
it.”6 
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We appreciate the attention, but we fear we’ve been misunderstood. 
Our view is that originalism is best seen as a theory of law, one in which 
“the original meaning of the Constitution is the ultimate criterion for con-
stitutional law, including of the validity of other methods of interpretation 
or decision.”7 More specifically, “[o]ur law is still the Founders’ law, as it’s 
been lawfully changed.”8 This means that originalism permits arguments 
from precedent, changed circumstances, or whatever you like, to the extent 
that they lawfully derive from the law of the founding. 
This kind of originalism, surprisingly common in American legal prac-
tice, is catholic in theory but exacting in application. It might look tame, 
but it has bite. 
FALSIFIABILITY 
isunderstandings like Posner’s may stem from two related confu-
sions. The first fails to distinguish the general nature of originalist 
theory from the much more specific empirical claims needed to sustain any 
given result. In our work we’ve noted many judicial opinions that made 
what we see as originalist arguments: Obergefell made originalist arguments; 
Brown made originalist arguments; Blaisdell made originalist arguments.9 
But that alone doesn’t establish whether these cases were right, as a matter 
of originalism. Those who disagreed with these cases made originalist argu-
ments too, and it’s unlikely that both sides were right. 
We maintain that originalist arguments are fundamental to American 
legal practice, and also that many of these arguments are mistaken. We point 
out many Supreme Court opinions consistent with originalism by way of 
demonstrating the ubiquity of originalist arguments – something Posner 
acknowledges, though he laments it.10 But the fact that lawyers and judges 
invoke originalism doesn’t show that their specific claims are right, any 
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more than a man’s waving a yardstick shows that he is tall. To make an 
argument is to risk falsification.11 
This confusion over falsification is evident in Posner’s complaint that 
it’s ridiculous to describe Obergefell v. Hodges as originalist when it “has no 
constitutional pedigree.”12 Posner’s assertion reflects an intuition that the 
Court misunderstood the law that the Fourteenth Amendment established, 
or misapplied this law to the facts, or something. It suggests that the Court 
was wrong to say that “[t]he generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of 
Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent 
of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future genera-
tions a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn 
its meaning.”13 This passage makes a claim about the law in 1868; to assert 
it is to make a constitutional, originalist case for Obergefell. To deny it is also 
to make an originalist case, this time against Obergefell – and to recognize 
the falsifiability of originalist claims. 
(Indeed, we see originalism as actually rather good at distinguishing good 
arguments from bad ones. It’s certainly better at doing so than “pragmatism” 
– under which it’s wickedly difficult to tell whether its practitioners are 
doing it right or wrong, especially in Posner’s hands.14) 
Our main point is this: General theories, open to a wide variety of facts, 
can be highly demanding once you fill in the details. The scientific method 
doesn’t prejudge whether the moon is made of green cheese. But the scien-
tific evidence for that claim is terrible, and applying the method should tell 
you so. That claims can be labeled terrible only after examining the evidence is a 
strength of the method, not a weakness. The presence of lunar conspiracy 
theories or crank claims about quantum physics doesn’t show that tools 
like space exploration or particle colliders lack bite; on the contrary, space 
exploration and particle colliders show the conspiracy theorists and cranks 
for what they are. 
                                                                                                                         
11 We won’t discuss in this brief space whether these arguments are insincere. See Richard 
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12 Posner, supra note 1, at 259 (citing 135 S. Ct. 2071 (2015)). 
13 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
14 See generally David F. Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791 (2009). 
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In the same way, originalism doesn’t prejudge whether Justice Kennedy 
or Justice Scalia is correct about the Fourteenth Amendment. It identifies 
tools and criteria for deciding who is right. 
ABSTRACTION 
related confusion is directed not at originalists in particular but at 
interpreting texts in general. Posner endorses a fictional judge who 
thought constitutional law was “just politics, filtered through a few vague 
phrases in an old document written by people who couldn’t possibly fathom 
what the world looks like today”;15 he portrays judicial pragmatism as  
inevitable when dealing with circumstances unforeseen by the drafters.16 
Another of our critics, Eric Segall, asks us quizzically: “How can the mean-
ing of words be simultaneously ‘fixed’ and ‘abstract’?”17 
Framers of legal texts deal with unforeseen circumstances by using their 
words – enacting abstract rules that tell us how to handle new facts. These 
abstract rules are still fixed, because they move from new facts to new 
outcomes in an unchanging way. (House seats change with each census, 
but the rule for allocation is fixed by Article I – even if the framers didn’t 
foresee the Baby Boom or the State of Hawaii.) All rules say that some 
facts matter and others don’t;18 all standards depend on certain facts in a 
certain way.19 To paraphrase Christopher Green, whose work too few 
scholars have read, the choice of what legal rule or standard to enact is the 
choice “about what sorts of changes should make a difference.”20 
So we think Judge Posner is guilty of a non-sequitur when he finds it 
“silly to ask whether . . . the Fourth Amendment forbids electronic surveil-
lance of suspected crooks or spies,” because “[t]he amendment’s authors 
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and ratifiers had no opinion on electronic surveillance.”21 The framers didn’t 
know about smartphones, sure, but they knew about property and viola-
tions of positive law – categories that mattered for the Amendment, and 
which apply no less to wiretaps.22 Similarly, the Fifth Amendment’s framers 
didn’t foresee the automobile (or even the railroad), but it’s not silly to ask 
if cars and trains are property under the Due Process Clause (they are).23 
Law deals in abstractions. 
Even if Posner is right that we can’t live by text alone, he misses what 
originalism has to offer. As we understand it, originalism supplies many 
resources for deciding cases and resolving ambiguities, like precedent and 
liquidation and common-law backdrops. But it supplies those resources for 
internal reasons, as (falsifiable) consequences of theory and history, not as 
side-constraints or mere faint-heartedness. Hence, it’s not enough for a 
judicial opinion to simply avoid disparaging originalism while deciding a 
case some other way; it has to use a methodology that’s itself pedigreed to 
and permitted by the founders’ law. 
Many judges – almost all, we think – try to do this, or represent that 
they should try. But not all of them succeed. 
THE BITE 
hese confusions seem to have led Posner and others to a broader mis-
understanding of our project. Some readers seem to think that our 
goal is to make originalism safe for the modern world – neither requiring 
popular precedents to be overturned,24 nor threatening the legitimacy of 
the administrative state.25 
But for better or worse, we make no such guarantees: We come not to 
bring peace but a sword. Originalism is a commitment to follow our orig-
inal law, as lawfully altered; that commitment can and almost surely will 
                                                                                                                         
21 Posner, supra note 1, at 258. 
22 See generally William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 1821 (2016). 
23 Baude, supra note 7, at 2357. 
24 Fleming, supra note 5, at 18-19. 
25 Jeremy K. Kessler, The Struggle for Administrative Legitimacy, 129 HARV. L. REV. 718, 759 
n.165 (2016). 
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require rejecting some contemporary practice. Any “meaningful theory . . . 
has to be willing to spend a little time in exile.”26 
In our theoretical work we’ve tried to avoid getting sucked into specific 
historical or doctrinal controversies, as that might detract from our argu-
ments about theory. But perhaps the time has come to start naming names. 
Without having done the research ourselves, we doubt (say) that the orig-
inal Constitution let states impair contracts on claims of “economic emer-
gency”27 – or that this power was ever lawfully conferred since. We like-
wise doubt the pedigree of modern cases on executive agreements;28 jury 
numbers or unanimity;29 counsel comment on failure to testify;30 one-
person one-vote;31 diversity jurisdiction for D.C. citizens;32 “commerce” 
regulation of wholly intrastate activity;33 administrative adjudication of 
private rights;34 and maybe even commandeering state officers35 or Article 
III limits on standing.36 Maybe the cases are right despite our doubts, or at 
least tolerable under original doctrines of stare decisis. (Again, we haven’t 
done the research.) And maybe more, or more controversial, cases belong 
on that list. But the fact that originalism brings these cases into doubt, or 
even disrepute, shows that the theory has real bite. 
We see these individual cases as largely irrelevant to the battle over in-
terpretive theory. But their fates may well be implications of that battle, 
and are all the more reason to take theory seriously. 
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